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A Role for Instructions 
 
Summary 
The paper is concerned with instructions as a way of setting premises for subsequent 
decisions in models of teams à la Marschak-Radner, under information diversification. 
The paper suggests that instructions can bridge people’s differences in knowledge: they 
do not require mutual understanding between the sender and the receiver as other forms 
of communication do. In particular, the knowledge of both the team payoff function and 
the team organisation can be ordered according to hierarchical ranks. First, the paper 
shows the equivalence between commands and communication in Marschak and Radner 
(1972). Second, it derives the requirements in terms of knowledge of the members that 
follow from given structures of task assignment, information diversification and 
message flows. Hierarchical ranks are shown to correspond to different degrees of 
intelligibility of the members with respect to the team operations. 
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1 Introduction
In working life, at same stage, it is everybody’s experience to receive orders, while it
is somebody’s experience to issue instructions to subordinates. Nevertheless, organisa-
tion theories do not often provide a speciﬁc role for instructions.
Broadly speaking, instructions serve two different purposes. On one side, they can
be the instrument for training on-the-job. On the other side, they transmit guidelines
and premises for making subsequent decisions when tasks are interdependent. In the
ﬁrst case, instructions deal with problems of acquisition of knowledge. Instead, in
the second case, instructions can bridge people’s differences in knowledge, without
people reaching mutual understanding. Indeed, if the transmission of premises for
making subsequent decisions implied mutual understanding between the sender and the
receiver of those premises, instructions would just be another word for communication.
∗Address: Department of Statistics, Universit` a degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, via Bicocca degli Arcim-
boldi 8, 20126 Milano, Italy, email: irene.valsecchi@unimib.it
1Instead, the term instructions conveys the idea of unquestioned guidelines in contrast
with the act of exchange intrinsic to the term communication.
In the organisation literature the role of instructions is discussed equivalently under
the heading of command and orders. Indeed, the above mentioned, particular notion of
instructions is proposed by Simon (1991, p.31-32) who argues that:
Most often, the command takes the form of a result to be produced ...
or a principle to be applied... or goal constraints....Only the end goal has
been supplied by the command, not the method of reaching it......
Commands do not usually specify concrete actions but, instead, deﬁne
some of the premises used in making decisions for which they are respon-
sible...
We need to delegate within guidelines, which creates the problem of
monitoring the observance of guidelines without recentralising what has
just been delegated....
If authority is used to transmit premises for making decisions rather
than commands for speciﬁc behaviors, then many different experts can
contribute their knowledge to a single decision....
The present paper is speciﬁcally concerned with instructions as a way of setting
premises for subsequent decisions when the knowledge of economic agents does not
mutually overlap. In that case, the receiver of instructions will not be able to gain any
information about the state of the world from the same instructions.
The starting point of the paper is the theory of teams of Marschak and Radner
(1972), particularly suited to the analysis of informationally decentralised systems, i.e.
organisations composed of solidaristic agents who are informed about different state
variables relevant for the common decisional process. In particular, the paper considers
teams with payoff functions that depend on both the actions of the team members and
the state of the world. The building elements of the team organisation will be:
a) the assignment structure (which member performs which tasks),
b) the information structure (which member observes which parameters of the state
of the world),
c) the message structure (which type and channels of communication exist among
team members),
d) the competence structure (which member knows which relationships among the
parameters of the state of the world)
e) the comprehension of the team members of the team environment (what a mem-
ber knows about the other members’ tasks, information, messages and competence).
The knowledge of a member corresponds to his competence and comprehension.
The paper shows that in teams ` a la Marschak-Radner decentralisation, i.e. the dis-
semination of information among several decision makers, necessarily demands for a
complete competence of all the team members about the relationships among the state
variables, as well as a through awareness of ”who does what in the light of which infor-
mation” for every team member. The implicit burden of informationally decentralised
systems on the members’ technical and organisational knowledge is shown to be so
exhaustive to enable every member to derive the optimal decision rule for the entire
2team. In other words, the elements d) and e) of the team organisation, implicit in the
analysis of Marschak and Radner, need be particularly powerful in order to support de-
centralised systems. In particular, all the members must possess a precise knowledge
of the entire organisational model, independently of the team size.
Moreover, the paper shows that the same requirements in terms of distribution of
knowledge among members devoid instructions of any role distinct from communi-
cation in teams ` a la Marschak-Radner. Indeed, the members are shown to be able to
decode messages to such an the extent that optimal orders convey their own justiﬁca-
tion, as Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) suggest. Members follow orders not out of
a sense of duty, but because the updating of beliefs induced by the commands makes
to obey optimal.
The paper proceeds to consider a simple model of team production where members
can transmit the values chosen for the action variables under their control. By tracing
the ﬂows of the messages, ranks can identify the ordered sequence of the decisions
within the team. Given a message structure, the paper deﬁnes the necessary and sufﬁ-
cient requirements in terms of knowledge imposed by the derived hierarchical structure
of messages. The paper shows that in informationally decentralised systems hierarchi-
cal ranks can correspond to different and ordered degree of intelligibility of the team
operations. In other words, the knowledge of the members in different ranks are char-
acterised by a sort of matryoshka property in a such a way that the knowledge of the
sender of instructions must encompass the knowledge of the receivers. The result sug-
gests that hierarchies can be an efﬁcient way of dealing with the distributed knowledge
of its members, along with the dissemination of information among the members.
In this sense, it may not only be cheaper for a central agent to make the collective
decision and transmit it rather than retransmit all the information on which the decision
is based, as Arrow (1974) suggests. But it may be useless as well for a central agent
to transmit his information if the receivers cannot understand the signiﬁcance of that
information. Elite control can realise economies in the ﬂows of information, as Arrow
(1991) points out, but overall it can realise economies in the computational capabilities
of the members of the organisation.
Thepapershowsthat, undersomeconditions, theknowledgeofthememberswithin
the same rank will have to increase as the diversiﬁcation of information in the rank
increases. Although the paper does not consider the costs of acquiring knowledge
explicitly, a prediction of the paper is that ﬂatter organisation are a consequence of the
empowerment of their members.
The approach taken in the paper is sympathetic, although not analogous, to the
analysis of Segal (2001), who shows that authority is the simplest communication al-
lowing coordination in a complex environment. Some results of the paper are similar
to those achieved by Garicano (2000), who shows that a knowledge-based hierarchy is
a natural way to organize the acquisition of knowledge when matching problems with
those who know how to solve them is costly. However, in Garicano ranks organize a
process of search for problems that arise during the production process and that can
be ordered by frequency or complexity. Instead, in the present paper ranks are always
active and the knowledge of the organisational model is as much relevant as the exper-
tise concerning the team payoff function. The idea of hierarchies as an order system of
setting premises for further decisions is the distinctive mark of the present paper with
3respect to the hierarchical models in which ranks combine sequential to parallel opera-
tions (for instance, Radner 1993). Finally, since the paper is concerned with the theory
of teams, it is not related to delegation in principal-agent models like Aghion-Tirole
(1997) (just to quote one of the many contributions on the subject).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the set-up of
the basic team model to be analysed. Section 3 is concerned with Marschak and Rad-
ner’s results in order to a) determine the level of the members’ knowledge required
by informationally decentralised systems, and b) show the equivalence between order
and communication in that framework. Section 4 formalises the idea of an hierarchi-
cal systems as a joint mechanism of transmission of decisions from top to bottom and
economies in the distribution of knowledge across team members. Section 5 concludes.
2 Set-Up
The following basic model of team production is derived from the theory of teams of
Marschak and Radner (1972) to a great extent. The main departures from the original
set-up will be highlighted in due course.
Let V be the ﬁnite set of K team action variables, with an element of V denoted
by vk; let ak be the real value of the action variable vk. For every vk in V , the value
ak is an element of the feasible set Ak, and each team action is described by the values
of a K-tuple a = (a1,...,aK), that belongs to A that is the set of feasible team actions
(equal to the Cartesian product XiAk).
The team gross payoff function, denoted by ω, depends on both the team action
and the state of the world. In particular, let X be the set of the states of the world,
represented by points in a K-dimensional space of variables. In such a way, each state
of the world is described by the values of a K-tuple x = (x1,...,xK) where xk is the
real-valued outcome of the parameter labelled sk, with S equal to ∪ksk.
Assumption 1 :
a) the team gross payoff function ω (x,a) is represented by







b) The matrix [gkz (x)] is positive deﬁnite for every x, gkk(x) = 1 for every k,
with k = 1,...,K, and gkz(x) = −q for every k 6= z.
c) There exists a unique prior joint density function of (x1,...,xK), denoted by
f (x1,...,xK). It is a multi-normal density function with E(xk) = 0, E(x2
k) = 1.
From Assumption 1 a), for every state of the world the team payoff is a quadratic
function of the action variables, while q is a measure of the interaction between action
variables. From Assumption 1 b), attention is conﬁned to the cases where there exists
a maximum payoff for every ﬁxed state of the world x.
Let I be the ﬁnite set of L team members, with an element of I denoted by i and
K ≥ L ≥ 2. A team member is a unit of ”action and understanding”, i.e. he will take
action on the basis of his data and knowledge.
4Although not explicitly present in Marschak and Radner, in order to deﬁne the re-
lationship between action variables and team members, let a team assignment structure
δ be a partition of V into L subsets collecting the action variables controlled by each
team member. In particular:
Assumption 2 the assignment function of the ith member, denoted by δi, is the proﬁle
(δi1,...,δiK) such that δik = 1 if the ith member controls the value of the action
variable vk, while δik = 0 if the ith member does not control the value of the action
variable vk, with k = 1,...,K. The team assignment structure is the matrix δ = [δik],
with
P
i δik = 1 for every k, i = 1,...L and k = 1,...,K.
¿From Assumption 2, there is no opportunity of joint responsibility among mem-
bers for the same action variable. Let Di be the subset of action variables controlled
by the ith member, i.e.:
Di = {vk ∈ V | δik = 1} (2)
Given Assumption 2 and (2), Di ∩ Dj = ∅ ∀i 6= j, and
SL
i=1 Di = V . Hence
a team assignment structure will induce a function ρ : V → I such that for every vk
in V there exists exactly one i in I equal to ρ(vk) 1. The ith team member will take
action ak in Ak for every vk in Di, resulting in his action proﬁle ai.
The ith member will choose his action proﬁle ai on the basis of his understanding,
i.e. his data and knowledge. Data and knowledge will be deﬁned in four steps.
First step: the ith member will choose his action proﬁle ai on the basis of the
available information about the state of the world x.
Assumption 3 the information function of the ith member, denoted by ηi, is the proﬁle
(ηi1,...,ηiK) such that ηik = 1 if the ith member is informed of the value xk, at the
time of choosing ai; while ηik = 0 if the ith member is not informed of the value
xk, with k = 1,...,K. The team information structure is the matrix η = [ηik] with
i = 1,...L and k = 1,...,K.
Given η, let Si be the set of parameters the member i is informed about, and let xi
be the corresponding proﬁle of outcomes, i.e.:
Si = {sk ∈ S | ηik = 1} (3)
xi = (xk)sk∈Si
Let an informational structure be called decentralised when there are two members,
i and j, at least such that Si * Sj and Sj * Si from (3).
Since the focus of the paper will be on informationally decentralised organisations,
given Assumption 1 and (3), in order to rule out the cases of either null or complete
data, it will be assumed that, given:
I∅ = {i ∈ I | Si = ∅}
IΩ = {i ∈ I | Si = S}
1Consequently the set Di of action variables controlled by the ith member is the subset of V having
image i under ρ.
5the team information structure η is such that both I∅ and IΩ are proper subsets of
I.
ActuallyMarschakandRadnerconsidercasesofnulldataundertheheadingofrou-
tine procedures that yield the lowest gross expected team payoff (with no information
costs), in contrast to the case of complete data generating the highest gross expected
team payoff.
Second step: the ith member will choose his action proﬁle ai given the message
eventually received by other team members about the team action a.
Assumption 4 the message function of the ith member, denoted by τi, is the proﬁle
(τi1,...,τiK) such that τik = 1 if the ith member receives a signal cik relevant for the
value ak, at the time of choosing ai; while τik = 0 if the ith member receives no signal
cik relevant for the value ak, with k = 1,...,K. The team message structure is the
matrix τ = [τik] with i = 1,...L and k = 1,...,K.
Let a team message structure τ be called null when
P
i τik = 0 for every k, k =
1,...,K.
Given τ, let Vi be the set of action variables the member i receives a message about,
and let ti be the corresponding proﬁle of signals, i.e.:
Vi = {vk ∈ V | τik = 1} (4)
ti = (cik)vk∈Vi
The information xi available to the ith member in (3), coupled with the message
ti eventually received from other members in (4), constitute the data di available to
the ith member. Marschak and Radner do not consider message structures according
to Assumption 4 explicitly, because in their basic set-up the team information structure
alreadyembodiestheoutcomesofpreviouscommunication. Theydo, however, provide
examples of messages with and without errors in communication.
Third step: the ith member will choose his action proﬁle ai given his own compe-
tence about the relationships across the state variables. The competence of a member
is a measure of his expertise concerning the team payoff function. In particular:
Deﬁnition 1 given a subset ¯ S of S, the ith member will be competent about ¯ S if he





Assumption 5 : the competence function of the ith member, denoted by ϕi, is the
proﬁle (ϕi1,...,ϕiK) such that ϕik = 1 if the ith member is competent about a subset
of S containing sk; while ϕik = 0 if the ith member is not competent about any subset
of S containing sk, with k = 1,...,K. The team competence structure is the matrix
ϕ = [ϕik] with i = 1,...L and k = 1,...,K.
Given ϕ, let Qi be the greatest subset of parameters the ith member is competent
about, and let qi be the corresponding proﬁle of outcomes, i.e.:
6Qi = {sk | ϕik = 1} (5)
qi = (xk)sk∈Qi
From Assumption 5 and (5), it follows that every ith member knows the density






Moreover, every ith member can compute the marginal density function for all the





Fourth step: the ith member will choose his action proﬁle ai on the basis of his
comprehension of the team environment in terms of assignment, information, message
and competence structure. In a word, the ith member’s comprehension stands for what
the ith member knows about which tasks other members perform on the basis of which
data and competence.
Given an operator λj, let Iλi be the subset of I collecting all the team members
whose operator λj is known to the ith member. Consequently, say that:
a) the ith member’s reduced assignment structure is the matrix δri = [δjk] with
j ∈ Iδi and k = 1,...,K
b) the ith member’s reduced information structure is the matrix ηri = [ηjk] with
j ∈ Iηi and k = 1,...,K
c)theithmember’sreducedmessagestructureisthematrixτri = [τjk]withj ∈ Iτi
and k = 1,...,K
d) the ith member’s reduced competence structure is the matrix ϕri = [ϕjk] with
j ∈ Iϕi and k = 1,...,K.
The ith member’s comprehension is the proﬁle hi = (δri,ηri,τri,ϕri). It will
be assumed that every member is aware of his own tasks, data and competence, i.e.
i ∈ Iλi with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ for every i ∈ I.
The competence of the ith member, coupled with his comprehension of the team
environment, constitutes the knowledge ui of the ith member. In Marschak and Radner
neither members’ competence nor comprehension are mentioned in that it is assumed
that team members are homogenous under all respects with just the exception of infor-
mation diversiﬁcation.
Let the ith member’s knowledge be called complete when both his competence is
complete (i.e. Qi = S), and his comprehension is complete (i.e. hi = (δ,η,τ,ϕ)).
The data di available to the ith member, together with his knowledge ui, constitute
the ith member’s understanding.
Assumption 6 the team members share a common interest in the maximization of the
team payoff function in (1) 2. Every ith member chooses all the elements of his action
proﬁle ai simultaneously, given his understanding.
2Marschak (1955, p.128) deﬁnes teams in the following way:
We deﬁne a team as a group of persons each of whom takes decisions about something
different but who receive a common reward as the joint result of all those decisions.
7From Assumption 6, the ith member will choose his action proﬁle given his data
and understanding. Hence, given the ith member’s understanding, his action proﬁles
forallpossibledatawillbetherangeofsomeproﬁleofdecisionfunctions, onedecision
function αk(di | ui) for every vk in Di, with ak = αk(di | ui) . The resulting K-tuple
of decision functions, denoted by α = (α1,...,αK), will be called a team decision rule.
The purposes of the present paper are a) to analyse the distribution of knowledge
in informationally decentralised systems, and b) to specify a self-contained model of
organisation that does not need the intervention of any outside party, beyond the team
members themselves. Accordingly, let an organisational model be called viable in the
following sense:
Deﬁnition 2 given δ,η and τ, an organisational model will be said viable if:
- the competence of the members yields a well deﬁned optimal (i.e. payoff maximis-
ing) team decision rule
- the knowledge of the members allows each of them to compute and adopt the
relevant component of the team optimal decision rule.
3 Team production ` a la Marschak-Radner
In the theory of teams by Marschak and Radner (1972), the image of the enterprise is
that of a computer to be programmed to respond to speciﬁc information inputs. Essen-
tially, the team problem is to choose simultaneously the team information structure and
the team decision rule that will yield the highest expected team payoff, taking account
of information and decision costs.
In particular, Radner (1987, p.9) emphasises that:
The theory of teams ... is concerned with the efﬁcient use of informa-
tion in an informationally decentralized organization....The focus is on 1)
the incomplete dissemination of information among the several decision
makers (informationally decentralized), 2) the characteristics of decision
functions that are optimal, given that informational decentralization, and
3)thecomparisonofalternative(decentralized)informationstructures, un-
der the assumption that each one will be used efﬁciently.
Under Assumption 1, complete competence of every member and no messages ex-
changedbetweenthemembers, Radner(1962)showsthatthecomponentsoftheunique
Bayes team decision function are linear in the information variables. A team decision
function is called person-by person satisfactory if it cannot be improved by changing
the decision function of any one member in the team. Moreover, as Marschak and
Radner (1972) prove, every optimal team decision rule is person-by person satisfac-
tory, and the converse is true in this case, although not generally, because the payoff
function is differentiable and concave in the action variables.
In particular, in a decentralised system each member decides in the light of his
information, all however according to a decision rule agreed upon in advance (Radner
(1959)). Speciﬁcally, Radner (1962, p.862) argues the following:
8Suppose the decision functions of all but one member are ﬁxed; then,
the problem facing that one member becomes a one-person Bayesian prob-
lem, for the actions of the other members can then be considered as part
of ”the state of the world”, and he can therefore apply Bayes’ rule.
Hence, eachmembermaximiseshisexpectedteampayofffunctionderivingaperson-
by-person satisfactory decision rule, knowing the decision rules of all the other mem-
bers. It is the knowledge of the other members’ decision rules that allows the ith
member to take the other members’ actions as random variables with known probabil-
ity distribution in informationally decentralized systems. However, given the set-up of
Marschak and Radner, the members’ knowledge is sufﬁciently comprehensive to allow
every member to derive the entire optimal team decision rule. Indeed, if each member
knows the decision rules of all the other members, then the comprehension of every
member is complete. Moreover, given that all members decide according to a decision
rule agreed upon in advance, both the members’ knowledge and Assumptions 1 and 6
are common knowledge. Under those circumstances, the following can be proved.
Proposition 1 given a null message structure and complete competence of every mem-
ber, every ith member will choose his optimal decision rule if and only if the following
conditions are met:
a) the knowledge of every member is complete
b) the members’ knowledge and Assumptions 1 and 6 are common knowledge.
Proof. Given δ, the team information structure can be represented also by the
per-action information matrix ηK = [ηkz], with action variables along the rows and
parameters along the columns (k = 1,...K and z = 1,...,K), where ηkz = 1 (= 0) if
the member ρ(vk) is (is not) informed of the value xz, at the time of choosing aρ(vk).
It follows that ηkz = ηpz for every ρ(vk) = ρ(vp).
Given ηK, let Svk be the set of parameters the member in charge of vk is informed
about, and let xvk be the corresponding proﬁle of outcomes. Given the union of Svk
and Svz, let xvkvzbe the corresponding proﬁle of outcomes. Consequently:
Svk = {sz ∈ S | ηkz = 1}
xvk = (xz)sz∈Svk
xvkvp = (xz)sz∈Svk∪Svp
Given complete comprehension of every member, every member knows that:
ak = αk (xvk) ∀vk ∈ V. (6)
GivencommonknowledgeofAssumption1, everymemberknowsthatallmembers
9know that from (1) the expected team gross payoff function is the following one:


























αk (xvk)αz (xvz)f (xvkvz)dxvkvz
#
Given common knowledge of the members’ knowledge and of Assumption 6, ev-
ery member knows that all members know that the optimal ˜ α are the solution of the

















= 0 ∀vk ∈ V ∀x ∈ X
i.e.:
∂E [ω | xvk]
∂αk
= 0 ∀vk ∈ V ∀x ∈ X (9)
Ifsomemembers’comprehensionwerenotcompletewithrespecttotheassignment
or the information structure, those members could not proceed from (6) to (7) for every
vk in V , and compute their optimal decision rule.
If some members’ comprehension were not complete with respect to the compe-
tence structure, those members could not solve the system in (9) for every vk in V .
If condition b) were not satisﬁed, the ith member could not be certain of the jth
member’s decision rule.
Hence, since there exists a unique team optimal action rule for each information
structure, the same pre-requisites that allow each member to work out his individual
optimal decision rule will enable him to compute the decision rule of every other mem-
ber.
Proposition 1 helps understanding the demanding burden on the members’ com-
petence and comprehension that remains implicit in the analysis of organisational be-
haviour under informationally diversiﬁed structures. The dissemination of information
among several decision makers is supplemented by a sort of coordination mechanism
hidden in the brain of team members. Savings on information costs, realised through
10diversiﬁcation, are to compared with the cost of teaching all members the entire as-
signment and information structures, besides having all members to master complete
competence. Indeed, either team members are the real decision makers and then they
need knowledge to support a well deﬁned expected payoff function, or they are au-
tomata able to perform constrained optimisations and the real deus-ex-machina, the
organiser, is left unidentiﬁed. I will return to this point later in the next section.
In Marschak and Radner, since members’ intelligibility is such that the other mem-
bers’ actions can be considered as part of the state of the world, all the messages
received by the ith member can inﬂuence his action just because they convey infor-
mation. In this sense, there is no role for instructions distinct from communication
between members: the ith member will always be able to infer from the jth member’s
instructions the set of data on which those instructions are based, and, consequently, he
will adopt the received instructions as his own action rule. If anything is transmitted in
teams ` a la Marschak-Radner, it is just communicated set of data, with or without noise.
This particular issue is explained effectively by Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991,
p.211) who argue that:
Under traditional models of rational decision-making, a key part of the
speciﬁcation is that a rational decision maker can adopt any decision strat-
egy that depends only on what he knows. In these models, an optimal team
strategy will have each manager maximizing the expected payoff of the or-
ganization, given the information he has acquired and the signals he has
received when he makes his decision.... From the point of view of manager
i, the decisions made by others in the organization are random variables
because their are functions of their information. Equally, from the man-
ager’s point of view, the signals he receives are observed random variables
because they are functions of the information of those sending the sig-
nals... (It is assumed that) i can costlessly and instantaneously infer the
signiﬁcance of the signals communicated to him by other managers....(I)n
an optimal team strategy there is no role for instructions from any man-
ager to any other. That is, at an optimum, a superior may communicate
information to his subordinate but he never limits the set of actions that
the subordinate may undertake, nor does he directly set the objective the
subordinate pursues... When communication consists of orders,... then
the manager can infer from the orders themselves that is optimal to obey:
optimal orders convey their own justiﬁcation. When managers are not per-
fectly adept at interpreting communications, there can be a separate role
for instructions limiting the manager’s choice set.
Marschak and Radner provide examples of ”complete command”: orders are sent
from the jth member to the ith member, given Si ⊆ Sj. In fact, their assumption
according to which the member receiving the order is not allowed to make any adjust-
ments3 is redundant. Indeed, the following can be proved:
3
Marschak-Radner (1972, p.288): ”theirs not to reason why; theirs but to do or die”.
11Given members i and j, let mji be the difference between the cardinality of Sj and
Si in (3), and let ni be the cardinality of Di in (2), i.e.:
mij = ]Sj − ]Si given Si ⊂ Sj (10)
ni = ]Di
Proposition 2 given complete knowledge of every member and common knowledge of
the members’ knowledge and of Assumptions 1 and 6, provided that the team message
structure is such that the ith member receives a message from the jth member made of
as many distinct items as min{mij,ni} in (10), then the team will behave as if the ith
member had observed Sj.
Proof. The expected team gross payoff function is increasing in Si.
Suppose that mij ≤ ni. Communications from member j to member i, made of
mij distinct items, such that member i can induce the proﬁle (xz)sz∈(Sj−Si), will be
both feasible and optimal.
Suppose that mij > ni. There does not exist any communication from member
j to member i, made of ni distinct items, such that member i can induce the proﬁle
(xz)sz∈(Sj−Si).
If member j could choose all the action variables in (Di ∪ Dj), the optimal ˜ α
would result from the solution of the system in (8). Given Di, re-number member
i’s action variables in such a way that ai = (ai1,...,aini). The optimal action proﬁle
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˜ aik = E [gk (x) | xj] = ˜ αik (xj)
Consider a message ti = (¯ ai1,...,¯ aini) where ¯ aik = ˜ αik (xj). Knowing the action
rules of the −i members, ti and xi, member i’s action proﬁle will result from the
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aik = E [gk (x) | ti,xi] = E [gk (x) | xj] = ¯ aik
Proposition 2 shows that in teams ` a la Marschak-Radner optimal orders carry their
own justiﬁcations because they are an efﬁcient conveyor of information. Hence, opti-
mal orders are obeyed not out of a sense of loyalty or duty induced by a common payoff
function, but because they perfectly ﬁt in a framework in which the member receiving
the instructions can decode them, apply Bayes’ rule and return to play games against
nature.
Example 1 δ =
1 1 0





0 0 1 ϕ =
1 1 1
1 1 1
Given S2 ⊂ S1, suppose that member 1 sends a message, in the form of his advised
value for action 3 (i.e. ¯ a3), to member 2, who is in charge of the action variable 3.
Given (x1,x2), if member 2 were to adopt a3 = ¯ a3, then member 1 would choose:
a1 = β11x1 + β12x2 (11)
a2 = β21x1 + β22x2
¯ a3 = β31x1 + β32x2
where:
β11 = −
(1 − q) + qA3




2(1 + q)(1 − 2q)
β21 = −
q + qA3
2(1 + q)(1 − 2q)
β22 = −
(1 − q) + qB3








+ q (β12 + β22)
E [x3 | x1,x2] = A3x1 + B3x2
















M1 = −r13 + 2q (β11 + β21) + 2qr12 (β12 + β22)
M2 = −r23 + 2qr12 (β11 + β21) + 2q (β12 + β22)
rmn = cov(xm,xn)
A further example of the equivalence between command and communication in
Marschak and Radner is provided in the Appendix under Example 3.
4 Ignorance and Hierarchy
¿From Proposition 2, in teams ` a la Marschak-Radner, instructions can take the form of
an advice from the jth member to the ith member concerning the ith member’s action
variables, when the information of the jth member is ﬁner than that of the ith member.
Hence, what role can instructions play when information is disseminated among
members? Moreover, is there any way for having a rational decision maker adopt deci-
sion strategies that do not depend only on what he alone knows? Indeed, as Marschak
and Radner (1972, p. 312-313) note themselves:
The lowliest subordinate, even one’s horse or a simple automaton, is
leftamarginofdecisiontoexploitinformationthatismoreeasilyavailable
to the subordinate than to the boss, and to relieve the latter’s tasks from
trivia.
Moreover, to the example of complete command Marschak and Radner add an
example of partial command or delegation.
Possibly, thecommonuseofthewordknowledgeconcealssomemisunderstanding.
Indeed the term knowledge is used for both the act of being informed about the real-
ized outcomes of some variables (either by means of direct observation or by means
of communication) and the act of understanding the relationships between the vari-
ables generating the data themselves, besides a thorough comprehension of the team
organisation.
The approach taken in this paper is to start from Simon’s intuition, according to
which instructions deﬁne some of the premises used in making subsequent decisions.
Indeed, received premises are the easiest way to formalise the idea that instructions
allow the ith member’s choice to take account of something he does not understand. In
that case, the ith member’s decision strategy can depend on what other members, apart
from the ith member himself, know.
In order to analyse a simple setting, suppose that all messages concern some values
of the action variables under the control of the sender, i.e.:
Assumption 7 the team message structure τ is such that τik = 1 if the ith member
is informed of the ﬁxed value ak, at the time of choosing ai; while τik = 0 if the ith
member is not informed of the ﬁxed value ak, with vk / ∈ Di.
14Under Assumption 7, τik = 0 for every vk ∈ Di, while cik = ak. The message
ti received by the ith member is the proﬁle of values of the action variables the ith
member is informed about. Moreover, given Assumption 6, if τik = 1 for some vk ∈
Dj, then τjz = 0 for every vz ∈ Di.
Since every member chooses his action proﬁle once for all, a message structure
satisfying Assumption 7 implies an ordered sequence of decisions that can be traced
back in the following way.
Let Vij be the subset of action variables in (4) the values of which are controlled by
the jth member and communicated to the ith member. Let Ii0 be the subset of members
who command action variables the ith member is informed about. Consequently:4
Vij = {vk ∈ Vi | δjk = 1} (13)
Ii0 = {j ∈ I | Vij 6= ∅}
Hence, Vi =
S
I\i Vij. The members in Ii0 can always be grouped into two disjoint
subsets, Aio and Bio such that:
Aio = {j ∈ Ii0 | Vij = Dj} (14)
Bio = Ii0 \ Aio
In order to avoid tiresome deﬁnitions and notation, in what follows it will always
be assumed that
S ¯ m
m=1 Mm = ∅ if ¯ m < 1.
Ranks, deﬁned in the following way, can represent the sequence of decisions in-
duced by the message structure.
Deﬁnition 3 rank 1, denoted by I1, is the subset of members who are informed of no
action variable. Rank n, denoted by In, is the subset of members who are informed
of action variables under the command only of members of rank less than n, with one
member of rank (n − 1) at least and n ≥ 2. Hence given (13):
I1 = {i ∈ I | Iio = ∅} (15)
In =
(
















By construction, ∀i ∈ I, there will be a unique number ni, with 1 ≤ ni ≤ ˆ n, such
that i ∈ Ini. If ni = nj, with i,j ∈ I and i 6= j, then Vij = Vji = ∅. If ni < nj,
Vij = ∅.
4If anyone of Vi, Vij and Ii0 is empty, so are the other two. From Assumption (7), Vii = ∅. If Vij 6= ∅,
then Vji = ∅. Alternatively, if j ∈ Ii0, then i / ∈ Ij0.










Deﬁnition 4 the state space of the ith member of rank ni, denoted by Si,ni, is the set
of parameters known to the ith member (given ηi) or belonging to the state space of
membersofranklowerthanni whocontrolactionvariablestheithmemberisinformed
about. The message space of the ith member of rank ni, denoted by Vi,ni, is the set
of action variables communicated to the ith member (given τi) or belonging to the
message space of members of rank lower than ni who control action variables the ith































¿From (18) let ˆ xi be the proﬁle of outcomes in the state space of the ith member.
Let ˜ Si be the set of state spaces of the members other than i that are included in the
state space of the ith member. Let ˜ xi be the proﬁle of outcomes in ˜ Si.
ˆ xi = (xk)sk∈Si,ni
˜ Si =

Sj,nj | j ∈ Ii0
	









From (18) let ˜ Vi be the set of action variables that belong to the message space of the
ith member but are not observed by the ith member. Let Ii1 be the subset of members
who command over the action variables in ˜ Vi. Consequently:
˜ Vi = Vi,ni \ Vi (20)
Ii1 =
n
j ∈ I | Dj
\
˜ Vi 6= ∅
o
Given (20), for every member j in Ii0, Vj,nj ⊆ Vi,ni and (Ij0 ∪ Ij1) ⊆ (Ii0 ∪ Ii1).
¿From (14) the members in Ai0 can always be grouped into two disjoint subsets,
˙ Aio and ¨ Aio such that:
16˙ Aio = {j ∈ Ai0 | Ij0 ∪ Ij1 ⊆ Ai0} (21)
¨ Aio = Ai0 \ ˙ Aio
¿From (21) ˙ Ai0 is the subset of members who command over action variables that
are all observed by the ith member and who have a message space either empty or made
of action variables observed by the ith member. If the ith member belongs to rank In,

















Given (22), if the ith member belongs to rank In, I>(n−1) ⊆ I \ ˙ Ii0.
The members in

I \ ˙ Ii0

can always be grouped into two disjoint subsets, Mi1
and Mi2, such that Mi2 is the greatest subset, possibly empty, of members receiving
complete messages from members in Mi1, i.e.:












Mi2 = ∪ ¯ Mi2
Mi1 = I \

˙ Ii0 ∪ Mi2

Given message structures satisfying Assumption 7, the following Proposition deter-
mines the conditions (necessary and sufﬁcient) related to the distribution of knowledge
that make an organisational model viable.
Proposition 3 under Assumption 7, the knowledge of members making an organisa-
tional model viable is such that for every member i:
1) for every j ∈ Mi2 in (23):
Iλj ⊆ Iλi with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ (24)
∪j∈Mi2Qj ⊆ Qi
∪j∈Mi2Sj − ∪j∈Mi2Qj ⊆ Si ∪ Qi
2) for every j ∈ Mi1 :
Mi1 ∪ Mi2 ⊆ Iλj = Iλi with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ (25)
Qi = Qj
∪j∈(Mi1\i)Sj ⊆ Si ∪ Qi
3) conditions 1) and 2) are common knowledge for every i ∈ Mi1
17Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 3 identiﬁes the requirements in terms of knowledge that have to be sat-
isﬁed in an informationally diversiﬁed system in order to enable members to compute
their own optimal action rule.
Complete competence may be superﬂuous for all members if some state variables
never enter the members’ decision rules. The following Lemma shows under which
conditions some unobserved state variables are redundant in the competence set of
team members.
Lemma 1 If Si = ∅ for some i ∈ I1, the knowledge of members making an organisa-
tional model viable will be such that for every member j ∈ I:
Qj ⊆ S \ ¯ S with ¯ S = {sk | vk ∈ Di ∨ sk / ∈ Sj ∀j ∈ I}
As well as state variables, so messages may be unnecessary if they neither convey
information nor make the computational problem of the receiver easier. The following
Lemma deﬁnes the sufﬁcient conditions for messages to be redundant.
Lemma 2 if Sj ⊆ Si and Vj ⊆ Vi, the knowledge of members required by viability
will be the same in all organisational models with either j ∈ Ii0 \ ˙ Ii0 or j / ∈ Ii0.
¿From Proposition 3, ranks can have a somewhat new and signiﬁcant function in
realising economies of scale in the use of knowledge. Indeed, the following Lemma
shows that the knowledge of members in progressive ranks need be nested.
Lemma 3 Qˆ n ⊆ Q(ˆ n−1) ⊆ Q(ˆ n−2) ⊆ ...... ⊆ Q1
Iλˆ n ⊆ Iλ(ˆ n−1) ⊆ Iλ(ˆ n−2) ⊆ ...... ⊆ Iλ1 with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ
In this context, ranks correspond to different and ordered degree of intelligibility
of the team operations. Alike principal-agents models, ranks are not the elements of
an unproductive and sterile architecture directed to monitor the monitors of a unique
rank of productive agents. Alike Garicano (2000), all members in all ranks are always
active and the knowledge of the organisational model is itself as much relevant as
the knowledge of the production technology. Alike models of parallel and sequential
operations (Radner 1993), ranks are not a level of aggregation in the basic, identical
and repeated, computational task, but suggest a diversiﬁed management ability.
As a matter of fact, there are circumstances in which the potential function of ranks
gets wasted. The following Lemma deﬁnes the sufﬁcient conditions under which every
team members’ competence and knowledge need be complete.
Lemma 4 If for some ith member in Iˆ n there exists some jth member in I1 belonging
to I \ ˙ Iio, then all viable organizational models will require that:
Qˆ n = Q(ˆ n−1) = Q(ˆ n−2) = Q1
Iλm = I for every m ∈ I with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ
In contrast with Lemma 4, the following Lemma shows the conditions that need be
satisﬁed in order to minimize the distribution of knowledge among team members.
18Lemma 5 the minimum knowledge of members making an organisational model vi-
able is such that for every ith member in In and for every n:
I<n = ˙ Ii0 (26)
I>(n−1) = Iλi with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ























with the conditions in (26) common knowledge for every ith member in In
The following Lemma considersthe caseof symmetricinformation withinthe same
rank. In particular:
Lemma 6 under the conditions of Lemma 5, if Si = Sj = Sn for every i,j in In
and for every n, the minimum knowledge of members making an organisational model
viable will be such that for every n:
Qn = Sn+1 − Sn
Hence, the greater is the information diversiﬁcation within the same rank, the
higher will be the requirements in terms of knowledge. Moreover, as long as every
rank deﬁnes the premises for the decisions of the next rank, an organisational model
will not plan jumps of more than one step in the communication ladder among differ-
ent ranks. Finally, if the costs of enlarging members’ competence decrease, there will
jointly follow both a reduction in the number of ranks and the empowerment of the
lower ranks.


















Iλ1 = I Iλ2 = {2,3} Iλ1 = {3} with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ
Hence:
E [ω | d3,u3] = −x3α3 − a2
1 − a2
2 − α2
3 + 2q (a1α3 + a1a2 + a2α3)
∂E [ω | d3,u3]
∂α3
= 0 (28)
α3 (d3 | u3) = −
1
2
x3 + q (a1 + a2)
19E [ω | d2,u2] = −x2α2 − a2
1 − α2
2 + 2qa1α2+
+ E [−α3 (d3 | u3)[x3 + α3 (d3 | u3) − 2q (a1 + α2)] | d2,u2]
with α3 (d3 | u3) from (28)
∂E [ω | d2,u2]
∂α2
= 0 (29)







E [ω | d1,u1] = −x1α1 − α2
1+
+ E [−α2 (d2 | u2)[x2 + α2 (d2 | u2) − 2qα1 − 2qα3 (d3 | u3)] | d1,u1]+
E [−α3 (d3 | u3)x3 + α3 (d3 | u3) − 2qα1 | d1,u1]
with α2 (d2 | u2) from (29), and











∂E [ω | d1,u1]
∂α1
= 0 (30)
α1 (d1 | u1) = −
(1 − q) + q (r12 + r13)
2(1 + q)(1 − 2q)
x1
Now compare the previous results with an analogous case of a team ` a la Marschak-









Iλi = I (31)
with i = 1,2,3 and λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ

















Hence consider system b). It follows that:
∂E [ω | d1,u1]
∂α1
= −x1 − 2α1 + 2qE [α2 (d2 | u2) + qα3 (d3 | u3) | d1,u1] = 0
∂E [ω | d2,u2]
∂α2
= −x2 − 2α2 + 2qα1 (d1 | u1) + 2qE [α3 (d3 | u3) | d2,u2] = 0
∂E [ω | d3,u3]
∂α3
= −x3 − 2α3 + 2q [α1 (d1 | u1) + α2 (d1 | u1)] = 0
20α1 (d1 | u1) = −
(1 − q) + q (r12 + r13)
2(1 + q)(1 − 2q)
x1 (32)









E [x3 | x1,x2]
α3 (d3 | u3) = α3 (d3 | u3) = −
1
2
x3 + q (α1 + α2)
If x2 is sufﬁcient to x1 with respect to x3, so that r13 = r12r23, the optimal action
rules in (32) are the same that follow from (28) − (30). In this event the net expected
payoff of the organisational system in (27) will never be lower and will possibly be
higher than that of the organisational system in (31).
5 Conclusions
The paper is concerned with the endowment of knowledge that agents in a simple team
model must possess in order to have optimal interdependent actions, notwithstanding
decentralised information.
In particular, if some members can transmit the values chosen for their action vari-
ables to other members, hierarchical ranks can be interpreted as ordered degrees of
intelligibility of the team operations among the team members. The paper suggests
that instructions can be thought of as a similar type of message: they are a way of
setting premises for subsequent decisions when the knowledge of the agents does not
mutually overlap.
Some assumptions of the model presented in the paper could be relaxed. For in-
stance, the team payoff function is quadratic in the action variables, and there is no
garbling in the transmitted instructions. In particular, the portrait of hierarchies, sug-
gested by the paper, could be conducive to models in which superiors act in the quality
of ”experts” for their subordinates.
To sum up, the paper suggests that, along with the dissemination of information
among several decision makers, the control, i.e. the understanding, of the team oper-
ations can be diversiﬁed as well among team members. Flatter organisations demand
higher knowledge of their members. In this sense, the boundaries between economies
in the transmission of information and economies in the use of knowledge get blurred.
6 Appendix
Example 3 Consider the following example of the role of command in Marschak-
Radner, in a slightly modiﬁed set-up. In particular, suppose that:
1) there are only two ﬁnal action variables, a1 and a2, with ai ∈ {−1,1} ∨i
2) the team payoff function is ω (x,a) with
ω (x,a) = x1a1 + x2a2 − qa1a2 q ≥ 0
where x1 and x2 are random variables, statistically independent, each having a
continuous distribution symmetric around zero (E (xi) = 0).
21Consider the case of members working in series, i.e.:
η1 = (x1,x2) ⇒ (a1,a2) (33)
η2 = (a1,a2)
According to (33) member 1 observes (x1,x2) , computes (a1,a2) and sends a
corresponding command to member 2 who simply follows orders.
Let Bij represent the set of possible alternative messages that can be sent directly
from element i to element j, where i = 0,1,2 (0=nature, 1=member 1, 2=member 2).
In the present case:
B01 = space of pairs of real numbers - complete information
B12 = {(1,1),(−1,1),(1,−1),(−1,−1)}
B20 = B12 - complete command
B10 = B02 = ∅

















x1 + x2 − q
−x1 + x2 + q
x1 − x2 + q






E [˜ ω (x,a)] = 2
Z
q















− q [4F1 (−q)F2 (−q) − 1]
In the current example it is particularly evident that ”optimal orders convey their
own justiﬁcation” in Marschak-Radner. Indeed, the team would achieve the same
expected payoff if member 1 just sent a message γ (x), and not an order, to member 2.
Consider the following case:
η1 = (x1,x2) ⇒ γ (x) (35)
η2 = γ (x) ⇒ (a1,a2)
B01 = space of pairs of real numbers - complete information
B12 = {(1),(2),(3),(4)}
B20 = {(1,1),(−1,1),(1,−1),(−1,−1)}
B10 = B02 = ∅
Proposition 4 in (35) the expected team payoff will be the same as in (34) provided
γ (x) satisﬁes:
pr[γ (x) = X | si] A B C D
s1 1 0 0 0
s2 0 1 0 0
s3 0 0 1 0
s4 0 0 0 1
22where X ∈ {A,B,C,D}, A ∈ {1,2,3,4}, B ∈ {Ac}, C ∈ {(A ∪ B)
c}, D ∈
{(A ∪ B ∪ C)
c}
Proof. In the current example, the relevant set of the states of nature is S =
{s1,s2,s3,s4} where:
s1 : {x1,x2 | xi ≥ q ∀i}
s2 :

{x1,x2 | x1 ≤ −q , x2 ≥ −q}




{x1,x2 | x1 ≥ q , x2 ≤ q}
{x1,x2 | −q ≤ x1 < q , x2 ≤ x1}

s4 : {x1,x2 | xi ≤ −q ∀i}
























dF1 (x1)dF2 (x2) =
= pr(s2)
pr(s4) =
Z x1=−q Z x2=−q
dF1 (x1)dF2 (x2) = pr(s1)
Member 2’s action rule is given by:















E [x1 + x2 − q | γ (x)]
E [−x1 + x2 + q | γ (x)]
E [x1 − x2 + q | γ (x)]






E [x1 + x2 − q | γ (x)] = −E [−x1 − x2 − q | γ (x)] =
=
n
[1 − F2 (q)]
R




[pr(s1 | γ (x)) − pr(s4 | γ (x))]pr(γ (x))+
+
n
[1 − F1 (q)]
R
x2=q x2dF2 (x2) +
R x2=q
x2=−q µ2F1 (x2)dF2 (x2)
o
[pr(s2 | γ (x)) − pr(s3 | γ (x))]pr(γ (x))+
+
n
[1 − F2 (q)]
R
x1=q x1dF1 (x1) +
R x1=q
x1=−q µ1F2 (x1)dF1 (x1)
o
[pr(s3 | γ (x)) − pr(s2 | γ (x))]pr(γ (x)) − q
E [−x1 + x2 − q | γ (x)] =
=
n




[pr(s1 | γ (x)) − pr(s4 | γ (x))]pr(γ (x))+
+
(
[1 − F1 (q)]
R
x2=q x2dF2 (x2) +
R x2=q
x2=−q x2F1 (x2)dF2 (x2)+
[1 − F2 (q)]
R
x1=q x1dF1 (x1) + +
R x1=q
x1=−q x1F2 (x1)dF1 (x1)
)
[pr(s2 | γ (x)) − pr(s3 | γ (x))]pr(γ (x)) + q
23E [x1 − x2 − q | γ (x)] =
=
n




[pr(s1 | γ (x)) − pr(s4 | γ (x))]pr(γ (x))+
+

   
   





x2=−q x2F1 (x2)dF2 (x2)+





x1=−q x1F2 (x1)dF1 (x1)

   
   
[pr(s3 | γ (x)) − pr(s2 | γ (x))]pr(γ (x))+
+q
Suppose that, given si, member 1 sends a message γ (x) ∈ {1,2,3,4} to member
2 according to the following conditional distribution:
1 2 3 4
s1 β11 β12 β13 β14
s2 β21 β22 β23 β24
s3 β31 β32 β33 β34
s4 β41 β42 β43 β44
with
P4
j=1 βij = 1
Given si
E [ω | si] = βi1ω [¯ a1,¯ a2 | 1] + βi2ω [¯ a1,¯ a2 | 2]+
+ βi3ω [¯ a1,¯ a2 | 3] + βi4ω [¯ a1,¯ a2 | 4]
The maximisation of the payoff function requires that:
(¯ a1,¯ a2 | 1) 6= (¯ a1,¯ a2 | 2) 6= (¯ a1,¯ a2 | 3) 6= (¯ a1,¯ a2 | 4) (36)
A sufﬁcient condition for (36) is:
A B C D
s1 ε + m ζ ζ ε
s2 θ ι + n ι θ
s3 θ ι ι + n θ
s4 ε ζ ζ ε + m
where A ∈ {1,2,3,4},B ∈ {Ac},C ∈ {(A ∪ B)





E [µi | A]
∀i, 2ε + 2ζ + m = 2θ + 2ι + n = 1
It follows that:
E [ω | s1] = −2εq + m(µ1 + µ2 − q) + 2ζq
E [ω | s2] = −2ιθq + n(−µ1 + µ2 + q) + 2iq
E [ω | s3] = −2θq + n(µ1 − µ2 + q) + 2iq
E [ω | s4] = −2εq + m(−µ1 − µ2 − q) + 2ζq
Hence, if ε = ζ = ϑ = ι = 0 and n = m = 1, the resulting expected team payoff
will be the same as in (34).
Proof. of Proposition 3
24¿From (17), (22)and (23), given i ∈ In:
















Given δ,η,τ, (19) and (16), the optimal action rule of the ith member in Iˆ n will
result from the solution of:
























ciz = 0 ∀vk ∈ Di
The solution of (38) depends on the optimal action rules of all members in I \ Ai0
from (14). Since some members in I \Ai0 may transmit messages to members in Ai0,
the solution of (38) will depend on the optimal action rules of all members in I \ ˙ Ai0
from (21). Moreover, some members in I \ ˙ Ai0 may receive incomplete messages
from members in ˙ Ai0. Hence the solution of (38) will be jointly determined with the
solution of:
∂E [ω | dj]
ak
= 0 ∀vk ∈ Vj, j ∈ I \












= cjk = ak foreveryvk in∪z∈ ˙ IioDz,
for every j in I \ ˙ Iio, the subsystem made of the equations in (38) and (39) has m un-
knowns, where m = ]
 
V \ ∪z∈ ˙ IioDz

.
The ith member can solve the subsystem made of the equations in (38) and (39)
only if for every j ∈ I \

˙ Iio ∪ i

:
j ∈ Iλi with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ (40)
Iλj ⊆ Iλi
Qj ⊆ Qi
∪jSj ⊆ Si ∪ Qi
Given i ∈ Iˆ n, by construction, the subsystem made of the equations in (38) and (39)
is the same that needs be solved by all members in j ∈ I \

˙ Iio ∪ i

. Hence, given
25i ∈ Iˆ n and Qi satisfying (40) denoted by Qˆ n, the solution of the subsystem made of
the equations in (38) and (39) will require that for every j ∈ I \ ˙ Iio :
Mi1 ⊆ Iλj = Iλˆ n with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ (41)
Qj = Qˆ n
[
m∈I\( ˙ Iio∪j)
Sm ⊆ Sj ∪ Qˆ n
that satisﬁes the conditions in (25), since Mi2 = ∅ from (37).
Now consider the ith member in I(ˆ n−1). From (23), Mi1 ∩ Iˆ n = ∅. Hence, either
Mi2 is empty or Mi2 is equal to Iˆ n.
In the ﬁrst case, the ith member belongs to I \ ˙ Ijo for every j in Iˆ n, and the
conditions in (41) need be applied. In particular, Q(ˆ n−1) = Qˆ n.






= 0 ∀vk ∈ V \ ∪z∈ ˙ Ii0Dz (42)






= 0 ∀vk ∈ ∪z∈Iˆ nDz (43)
ForallcombinationsofdataandknowledgeofmembersinIˆ n satisfying(41)(hence
sufﬁcient to provide a well deﬁned solution to (43)), that same solution can be worked
out by the ith member in Mi1 provided:
∀j ∈ Iˆ n : (44)
Iλˆ n ⊆ Iλi with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ
Qˆ n ⊆ Qi
∪j∈Iˆ n Sj − Qˆ n ⊆ Si ∪ Qi
Given i ∈ I(ˆ n−1), by construction, the system made of equation in (42) is the same
that needs be solved by all members in j ∈ (Mi1 \ i). Hence, given i ∈ I(ˆ n−1) and Qi
satisfying (44) denoted by Q(ˆ n−1), the solution of the system made of the equations in
(42) will require that for every j ∈ Mi1 :
Mi1 ∪ Mi2 ⊆ Iλj = Iλ(ˆ n−1) with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ (45)
Qˆ n ⊆ Qj = Q(ˆ n−1)
∪m∈Iˆ nSm − Qˆ n ⊆ Sj ∪ Q(ˆ n−1)
[
m∈Mi1\j
Sm ⊆ Sj ∪ Q(ˆ n−1)
Now consider the ith member in I(ˆ n−2). From (23), Mi1 ∩ Iˆ n = ∅. Hence, either
Mi2 is empty or Mi2 contains Iˆ n.
26In the ﬁrst case, the ith member belongs to I \ ˙ Ijo for every j in Iˆ n, and the
conditions in (41) need be applied. In particular, Q(ˆ n−2) = Q(ˆ n−1) = Qˆ n.
In the second case, Mi2 is either equal to Iˆ n or to I>(ˆ n−2). If Mi2 is equal to Iˆ n,
the ith member belongs to I \ ˙ Ijo for every j in I(ˆ n−1), and the conditions in (45) need
be applied. In particular, Q(ˆ n−2) = Q(ˆ n−1).







= 0 ∀vk ∈ ∪z∈I>(ˆ n−2)Dz (46)
For all combinations of data and knowledge of members in I>(ˆ n−2) satisfying (41)
and/or (45)(hence sufﬁcient to provide a well deﬁned solution to (46)), that same so-
lution can be worked out by the ith member in Mi1 provided:
∀j ∈ I(ˆ n−1) : (47)
I(ˆ n−1) ⊆ Iλi with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ
Q(ˆ n−1) ⊆ Qi
∪j∈I(ˆ n−1) Sj − Q(ˆ n−1) ⊆ Si ∪ Qi
Given i ∈ I(ˆ n−2), by construction, the system made of the equations in (42) is the
same that needs be solved by all members in j ∈ (Mi1 \ i). Hence, given i ∈ I(ˆ n−1)
and Qi satisfying (47) denoted by Q(ˆ n−2), the solution of the system made of the
equations in (42) will require that for every j ∈ Mi1 :
Mi1 ∪ Mi2 ⊆ Iλj = Iλ(ˆ n−2) with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ
Q(ˆ n−1) ⊆ Qj = Q(ˆ n−2)
∪m∈Iˆ n−1Sm − Qˆ n ⊆ Sj ∪ Q(ˆ n−2)
[
m∈Mi1\j
Sm ⊆ Sj ∪ Q(ˆ n−2)
By induction, the proof follows for every In with 1 ≤ n < ˆ n.
Suppose that for i in In, with 1 < n < ˆ n, the conditions in (24) and (25) are
satisﬁed. Consider j in I(n−1). From (37), either a) I(n−1) ∈ Mi1 or b) I(n−1) ⊆ ˙ Ii0.
If a), then I \ ˙ Ii0 = I \ ˙ Ij0 and Mi1 = Mj1, and the conditions in (24) and (25)
are satisﬁed for j as well.






= 0 ∀vk ∈ V \ ∪z∈ ˙ Ij0Dz (48)






= 0 ∀vk ∈ ∪z∈I>(n−1)Dz (49)
27For all combinations of data and knowledge of members in I>(n−1) satisfying (24)
and(25)(hencesufﬁcienttoprovideawelldeﬁnedsolutionto(49)), thatsamesolution
can be worked out by the jth member in Mj1 provided:
∀j ∈ In : (50)
Iλn ⊆ Iλj with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ
Qn ⊆ Qj
∪m∈In Sm − Qn ⊆ Sj ∪ Qj
Given j ∈ I(n−1), by construction, the system made of equation in (48) is the same
that needs be solved by all members in (Mj1 \ j). Hence, given z ∈ I(n−1) and Qj
satisfying (50) denoted by Q(n−1), the solution of the system made of the equations in
(48) will require that for every z ∈ Mj1 :
Mj1 ∪ Mj2 ⊆ Iλz = Iλ(n−1) with λ = δ,η,τ,ϕ (51)
Qn ⊆ Qz = Q(n−1)
∪m∈InSm − Qn ⊆ Sz ∪ Q(n−1)
[
m∈Mj1\z
Sm ⊆ Sz ∪ Q(ˆ n−1)
The conditions in (51) are analogous to those in (25).
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